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ADMINISTRATION OF PLANKING IN LESOTHO : THE SECOND LAG
David Hirachmann 
I
A conference on research and training in  African  
public administration (held in  the early seventies) stressed 
that current research in  this f ie ld  should contribute to an 
understanding of s ign ificant institutions and processes in, 
and have an applied use for, particu lar countries, while 
at the same time laying the foundations fo r  the formulation 
at a la te r  stage of worthwhile hypotheses. This paper i s  
based on an examination of the evolution of the planning 
machinery in  one country, namely Lesotho. While i t s  1 
central argument derives from this specifidally -focused  
research, i t  i s  submitted that i t  provides an explanatory 
device or even hypothesis in  embryo, applicable more broadly 
to the development of the machinery of planning (and with at 
least some relevance to institu tiona l development in  general) 
in  new countries. ,,
The argument- contends that there are certain factors  
in  the planning environment, in  the manner in  which the 
planning agency i s  set up, in  the nature and scope of the 
tasks i t  i s  required to perform, and'iri- the attitudes of 
the c i v i l  service, which combine-&lmost i n e v i t a b l y to 
retard the expeditious and effective establishment and 
operation of the planning machinery.1 This phase-after the - 
formal launching of a central planning agency!by the newly 
independent government -  during which progress in  practice  
lags fa r  behind that in i t i a l ly  anticipated, i s  here 
described as the 'second l a g ' .  ~ .I %
The ' f i r s t  la g ' would re fe r  to the situation  
existing before the establishment of a central planning 
agency, principally  to the period of co lonial ru le. While 
co lon ia l administrators were required to engage in some of 
the tasks of planning, the product of the ir  e ffo rts  i s  
generally  regarded as defective. Kamarck, fo r  example, 
in  common with many other observers, described colonial  
plans as having been prepared by 'administrators with l i t t l e  
or no economic background',
z ~ -
in  which 'the coordination of investments in various sectors 
was non-existent' and as generally lacking any 'consistent 
development s t ra tegy ' .  He acknowledged, however, that they
had one v ir tue  seldom present in  early post-independence
2plans: 'they were carried out'*
In  Lesotho' s case i t  seems f a i r  to conclude.that 
both,:the:-pIans produced and the method of preparation were •• . 
inadequate. .Wallman provides a useful record of some 
unsatisfactory aspects of  pro ject  preparation and planning 
in  the early s ix t i e s .  A UNESCO mission described a plan 
prepared f o r  196 3- 1 9 6 6 -as 'not s t r i c t l y  a development plan 
since no targets were s e t ' ;  while one drafted in  1966 
was acknowledged by:one of the people p r inc ipa l ly  responsible 
f o r  i t ,  as;simply representing 'the maximum demands: of
■ ■ 5
M in is tr ies  .•■.in-1,96.6.  ^ unevaluated and unphased' A- more 
comprehensive .criticism, of economic po l icy  and programming 
in. pre-independence Basutoland was that ■■■ ' •
’ \ • * ; < • I . ’ . . * •*
k . . » .w l  • • • *
. . .  the old fashioned doctrine has prevailed (as i t  
always does where administration i s  devoid of 
economic advice) and has been r e f le c ted  in  the 
. . la i s s e z - fa i r e  att itudes of the B r it ish  author it ies  
to th:e Basotho's economic problems* This complacent 
^fallacy explains the t o t a l . ine f fec t iveness  of ; 
the B r it ish  administrators' so-ca l led  'development' , f. 
programmesc They have tinkered away with the t r i v ia " ' "
VT o f  infrastructure-, and .with disconnected p i l o t  :r
schemes, and have nagged away at the bewildered 
farmer'-to- achieve-miracles from his f i v e  acres of 
eroded land. 'V ' l  '■ ■' • . :
The ■’leader of the Basutoland Congress Party, Ntsu Mokhehle, 
complained-at the time that B r i t ish  money was doing no more i 
than financing government services and such other infrastructure 
'as i s  conducive to Her Majesty 's Government's concept of
maintaining a colony. Not a single industry has been.
7
estab l ished '.
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Riggs acknowledged what he described as 'the spectre 
of  determinsm' in his eco log ica l  approach to development 
administration but re jected  the view of administrative 
behaviour as ’ nothing more than the outcome of a part icu lar  
configuration of in terac t ing  pressures '.  He asserted rather 
that both the influence of the new environment upon the 
subject and the subject upon i t s  environment should beg
spec i f ied .  While the v a l id i t y  of this point i s  recognized, 
in  this assessment of the likehood of a second lag in 
establishing the machinery and processes of planning, the 
’ spectre of determinism' looms large# That such an early 
period of disappointment appears inherent in  the s ituat ion 
and almost inev itab le  i s  suggested in  the observations of 
a number of wr iters .  Weidner, fo r  example, notes that most 
new organizations, ’ par t icu lar ly  those with innovative goa ls ’ , 
undergo a period of anarchy in  the ir  early operating years*
' I t  i s  something that must be l i v ed  through. I t  may help
Q
to recognize the in e v i t a b i l i t y  of this pe r iod ' .  Colin Leys
argues that there are a ’ superabundance' o f  reasons fo r
planning to f a i l ,  and therefore that i t  was 'more or less
bound to f a i l ,  given the probabi l i ty  that many of these
factors  w i l l  be present in  any s i t u a t i o n ' . ^  Papanek writes
that the exercise of the planning function inev itab ly  raises
serious opposition# As the ’ advocate of economic ra t iona l i ty *
and having a concern fo r  long-term goals, a central planning
agency often c o n f l i c t s  with the Ministry of Finance,
'concerned with balancing the budget' and with operational
m inistr ies  and p o l i t i c a l  leaders. Further, i t  w i l l  f ind
i t s e l f  'trespassing on t e r r i t o r y  previously staked out by
other agencies, who f ind they now have to contend with a
new in s t i tu t ion  in  what they have come to regard as th e ir
11private  preserve ' .  Haq discusses the ' usual teething 
troubles* of planning agencies which su f fe r  from 'shortage 
o f  s t a f f ,  absence of s t a t i s t i c a l  data, uncertain status in
Government and resentment from other strongly entrenched
1 ?
M in is tr ies  and Departments'. One sees this too in  White’ s 
'paradigm' ind icat ing  early problems followed by la t e r
improvements in the pos it ion  of the planning machinery, 1
A f in a l  example comes from Seers who compares the 
s ituat ion to a prototype p lot of the dramatist: ’ in this
certa in  types of people, a l l  of whom are ind iv idual ly  well
i
meaning and in t e l l i g e n t ,  are so constituted that they are 
l og ica l ly  bound, when they are brought together, to produce 
results  which appear tragic  or comic or both’ c The three 
leading parts -  the p o l i t i c ia n ,  the planner and the t rad it iona l  
c i v i l  servant -  may each be played quite reasonably according 
to ' th e i r  own l i g h t s ' ,  but she outcome i s  i r ra t io n a l  because 
o f  basic d i f ferences in  approach, tasks, education ’and the 
experiences which have moulded them-, As time passes, however, 
the s ituat ion may well  improve: planning tends to become
more r e a l i s t i c ;  experience teaches p o l i t i c ia n s  the need to 
confront the strateg ic  issue before the country; un ivers it ies  
structure relevant soc ia l  science sy l lab i ;  the younger c i v i l  
serv ice  recru its  have a more dynamic approach to po l icy  issues 
than the ir  seniors who in  any case 'become Ynore accustomed in 
the course of time to the planning o f f i c e  as part of the 
administrative scene ' . ^
I t  i s  necessary at this point to mention that the 
pr inc ipa l  argument contends that early fa i lu re  i s  almost 
inev itab le ,  not absolutely sc. The presence of certa in  
rather special elements in  the environment may serve to 
prevent a second lag : these would include unusually firm 
and consistent p o l i t i c a l  backing fo r  planning, combined with 
e i ther  a substantial r ise  in  domestic resources ( f o r  example, 
the discovery of new mineral deposits or a dramatic 
increase in  the price of major exports), or/and an unusually 
high degree of pro ject preparedness and donor readiness to 
acce lerate  aid negotiation. In Lesotho in  the early years 
a f t e r  independence no such special circumstances prevailed; 
on the contrary the environment in  which planning had to 
operate was both harsh and circumscribed beyond the norm of 
other Afr ican countries^ In part icu lar,  the administration 
of planning suffered from unconvincing support by the. 
p o l i t i c a l  leaders fo r  planning, a paucity of domestic 
resources, comprehensive dependence on neighbouring South 
A fr ica ,  doner dominance of the develop: nt programme, and 
numerous administrative obstacles and shortcomings in 
s t a t i s t i c s  and information0
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FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECOND LAG
Y outh versus experience
The f i r s t  dysfunctional phenomenon ’ l o g i c a l l y  bound1 
to occur appears to be the c o n f l i c t  between youth-inexperience 
and age-experience. The general problem of an ’ educational 
generation gap', in which a more highly educated post­
independence generation of recru its  challenges the ir  more
experienced and already entrenched seniors has been widely 
15noted. Of more immediate concern i s  the fact  that un t i l
r e la t i v e l y  recently, few un ivers it ies  o f fered  training fo r  
planning spec ia l is ts ,  nor was the f i e l d  of study emphasized. 
Thus most products of such tra in ing belong to the post­
independence generation. Tinbergen’ s survey of nineteen 
countries, which showed c lea r ly  that a high proportion of 
planning personnel had no previous employment, confirmed 
that planning was generally carried out by .younger members 
o f  the c i v i l  serv ice .  ^  Thus not only i s  the agency i t s e l f  
new, and i t s  procedures and concepts innovative, but the 
people responsible fo r  establishing i t  are young; and, as
Papanek notes, ’ youth in i t s e l f  i s  enough to cause
17opposition among some conservative bureaucrats'.
This fac tor  has been present in Lesotho and has been 
the cause of considerable d isa f fe c t ion .  Two comments by 
Basotho c i v i l  servants may be mentioned:
The youth and the image of young-smart-qualified 
of the Central Planning and Development O ff ice  caused 
a lo t  o f  resentment. Middle-aged c i v i l  servants did 
not want someone l ik e  . . .  coming in and saying do 
this and do that. Often they would rather f i l l  in  
the pro ject memorandum badly than go and ask the 
Planning O ff ice  how to do i t .  ^
. . .  you have a generation gap. The CPDO is  
s ta f fed  almost en t ire ly  with very young bright 
upstart co l lege  graduates and I think that people 
in  the m in istr ies  -  just because in  Basotho society 
elders are held in  great respect cannot take these
people seriously no matter what th e ir  qua l i f ica t ions . 19
The situation i s  not so much that younger people are placed
h ierarch ica l ly  above the ir  seniors - as say was the case
20with D is t r ic t  O f f icers  in Kenya -  but that they are placed
in  a posit ion of having to require th e ir  more experienced
colleagues in  the m in istr ies  to conform to-new pract ices .
When the response from the older administrators has been
in d i f f e r en t  or negative, these less  experienced, often
more enthusiastic o f f i c e r s  have become resentful and
frustrated. That such a s ituat ion might be temporary i s
c lea r ;  however, in  Lesotho, the rapid turnover of s t a f f
and the continual promotion out of the O ff ice  of i t s
r e l a t i v e l y  more experienced members has l e f t  the O ff ice  lacking
21both experience and sen ior i ty .  For example, not one member 
of. the CPDO who had gained some experience from part ic ipa t ing  
in  the formulation of Lesotho's F irs t  Plan was s t i l l  in  the 
O f f ice  when preparation of the country's Second Plan 
c ommenc ed.
Heightened expectation and suspicion
The public ity  and fanfare which typ ica l ly  accompanies 
the establishment of a central planning agency, and the ' 
i n i t i a l  words of support i t  receives from the highest 
p o l i t i c a l  quarters, serve to raise considerable expectations 
of the new agency’ s capacity to contribute to the country's 
progress. I t  is  highly unlikely, however, that l o c a l ly  
qu a l i f ied  personnel w i l l  be immediately ava i lab le  to f u l f i l  
such expectations; and even i f  they were, antic ipated 
development -  based on a probable overestimation of the 
poten t ia l  impact of planning -  would not fo l low  in  consequence. 
Simultaneously as expectations are raised, suspicions are 
aroused among many in f lu en t ia l  members of the c i v i l  service, 
who are disturbed by the new agency's ' trespassing ' on 
th e i r  t e r r i to ry ,  demanding new ways of thinking, intruding 
with new terminology and.advice, and inev itab ly  adding 
to an already heavy workload. In Lesotho, the■resultant 
negative att itude towards planning seriously hindered the 
e f f o r t s  of the Central Planning and Development O ff ice  (CPDO), 
so reducing i t s  chances of early success, and aggravating 
the extent pi the setback. Suspicion soon turned to 
scepticism and vocal c r i t ic ism  once i t  became apparent that 
the new agency was not proving an instant panacaea.
Ambitious terms of reference
Invariably -  and certa in ly  in  Lesotho - when the 
planning machinery i s  established i t  i s  provided with terms 
of reference which cover the fu l l  gamut of planning tasks, 
including long-term, medium-term and annual plans; research; 
economic advice; progress reporting, monitoring and evaluation; 
cap ita l  budgets; pro ject  preparation; and aid negotiation.
The miniscule s t a f f  posted to man the o f f i c e  would be 
incapable of f u l f i l l i n g  these functions even i f  supported
22by the necessary data and the f u l l  backing of the m in is tr ies .  
Such a discrepancy appears predetermined in so fa r  as government: 
f e e l  i t  necessary to demonstrate externally ,  part icu lar ly  
to would-be donors, and in terna l ly  to poten tia l  c r i t i c s ,  
that they are in  earnest about r e la t ing  resources to 
p r i o r i t i e s  and planning the d irec t ion  of the new country's 
progress. I t  is  not p o l i t i c a l l y  acceptable to admit to the 
establishment of a planning o f f i c e  merely fo r  the purpose 
of pro ject preparation as to enhance aid opportunities. 
Furthermore, such a comprehensive range of tasks does present 
a planning o f f i c e  with a challenge as to the role  i t  should 
be f i l l in g . .  However, in  the preva i l ing  mood of the c i v i l  
service, i t s  in a b i l i t y  to perform many of the prescribed 
functions i s  given as evidence of the O f f i c e 's  fa i lu re ;  
and the disparaging description, 'begging o f f i c e ’ , i s  
applied where in fac t  i t  may be f u l f i l l i n g  just the i n i t i a l l y  
l im ited  role  intended fo r  i t .
The f i r s t  plan
Immediately a central planning agency i s  established, 
i t  i s  usually required to commence preparation of a 
f i v e - y e a r  plan. Not only w i l l  the agency i t s e l f  lack both 
personnel and data, but the m inistr ies  w i l l  not have the 
capacity to prepare sa t is fac tory  sectoral submissions.
Although i t s e l f  weak, the planning o f f i c e  (which attrac ts  
the f i r s t  qua l i f ied  planning personnel) i s  l i k e l y  to have 
substantial ly greater planning capacity than the 
m in is tr ies ,  and thus given the l imited time allowed, i t  
w i l l  have l i t t l e  choice but to take over some of the 
m in is tr ies '  work.
While this in i t i a t i v e  i s  necessary, f r i c t i o n  'w i l l  almost
invariably fo l low  since the M in is tr ies  r es is t  implementing
2 ^p ro jects  prepared by an outsiue au thor ity ' .  _ Pratt 
i l lu s t r a t e s  the problem in his discussion of the preparation 
of Tanzania's f i r s t  plans the m in istr ies  f e l t  themselves 
seriously intruded upon and beleaguered by the Ministry of 
Development Planning, and several f a i l  id en t ire ly  to 
c ooperate•
The suspicions which had been bu ilt  up during 
the months of controversy when theplan was being 
.prepared l e f t  a heritage of h o s t i l i t y  and a mood of 
non-cooperation which were important obstacles to the 
e f f e c t i v e  implementation of the plan. 24
In Lesotho, preparation of the F irs t  Plan took place 
without benefit  of a functioning planning machinery, with 
l im ited  consultation and weak sectoral contributions.
Because of the ' in a b i l i t y  of the M in istr ies  to produce 
d ra f ts '  much of the plan was necessarily written in  the 
CPLO. Had the Planning O f i ice  not taken this in i t i a t i v e  
the Plan may not have been produced at a l l -
-This has the unfortunate e f f e c t  that some 
m in istr ies  ace committed to implementing p o l ic ie s  with 
which they do not f e e l  involved. They may have agreed 
with the drafts in  a negative way ( i . e -  they did not 
a c t iv e ly  disagree with them) but they do not f e e l  that 
the p o l ic ie s  are th e ir  own, or that they need make any 
special e f fo r t  to .implement.them. 25
The Planning Office reaped l i t t l e  c red i t  fo r  i t s  e f fo r ts ;  
rather i t  attracted substantial c r i t ic ism  -  yet in  the 
circumstances i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  toimagine how i t  could have 
done much better. The Plan did l i t t l e  to encourage in teres t  
in  or respect fo r  planning procedures or the -Office. The - 
post-Plan mood was not as hos t i le  as indicated in P ra t t ' s  
example; i t  would be more accurate to describe i t  as 
uncooperative and cyn ica l ly  in d i f f e ren t  as to whether ■ 
pro jects  presented related to the Plan or not.
’ Thus in  the early years a f t e r  i t s  publication, the 
F irs t  Plan reinforced the second lag; towards the end of the 
plan period, however, (as w il l  be discussed), i t  may be 
said to have contributed towards overcoming i t .
-  9 -
Contradictory pressures
The pressures exerted on a central planning agency 
in the early years are not only numerous, they are often 
contradictory. Vernon, fo r  example, notes that from the day 
he commences work the planner is  the target of two streams 
of demands:, one requires him to 'frame p o l ic ie s  to meet 
the c r i s i s  already in  being, without waiting a moment to 
improve his knowledge'; the other requires that he 'develop 
a global long-term strategy that i s  comprehensive, consistent
9 ii
and optimal1. C learly ,  overemphasis on one to the 
neglect of the other involves dangers fo r  the planner. 
S im ilar ly ,  the planner is  usually advised that the f i r s t  
plan should be adaptable and f l e x ib l e ;  yet he i s  also to ld
27that i t  i s  intended as a so l id  guide 'and not a chameleon'.
In Lesotho, expectations and requirements of the 
CPDO are often contradictory. While some c i v i l  servants 
want i t  to take i n i t i a t i v e  and lead, others pre fer  i t  to 
remain in the background and not in t e r fe r e ,  A further 
inconsistency i s  involved in the fact  that many of those 
who encourage a more pos it ive  ro le ,  baulk at the idea of 
ra is ing  i t s  status and authority so as to enable i t  to 
exact compliance with i t s  procedures. Yet others who 
expect i t  to carry out functions more a c t iv e ly  and 
e f f e c t i v e l y ,  e.g. to improve i t s  coordinative function, are 
obviously unenthusiastic about being coordinated by i t  and 
los ing  the ir  room fo r  manoeuvre. A f in a l  ind ication of this 
i s  seen in  the c r i t ic ism  of the planners i f  they 
misunderstand donor intentions, and suspicion that they 
may be in cahoots with donors i f  they antic ipate accurately 
donor reactions to pro jects .
Uncertainty results too from the numerous new ideas 
and emphases which c ircu la te .  These are picked up at 
in ternational conferences and seminars, and v i s i t in g  missions 
are frequently brimming with innovations about development 
and planning. An awareness of possible improvements and 
exposure to new methods has i t s  advantages, but the 
consistent f low of suggestions also creates doubts about 
ongoing procedures and detracts from a determination to per­
severe with undertakings.
P aucity  of s t a t i s t i c s
Lack of r e l ia b le  s ta t i s t i c s  i s  an obstacle which 
confronts planners not only at the commencement of the ir  
work, but which continues to plague them therea fter .  A 
newly-established central s t a t i s t i c a l  bureau faces many 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  comparable with a central planning o f f i c e  in 
terms of qua l i f ied  personnel, in i t i a t in g  of new information- 
gathering procedures and the response of c i v i l  servants to 
them; in  addition, the demand fo r  s ta t i s t i c s  is  l i k e ly  to 
outpace i t s  capacity to produce more and better  information 
once i t s  performance begins to improve.
A continuing impediment to s t a t i s t i c a l  development 
derives from the fact  that improved questionnaires, 
c o l l e c t io n  procedures and c la s s i f i c a t io n s  tend to negate 
the v a l id i t y  of benchmark data, thus reducing the usefulness 
of any early conclusions as to discerned trends and 
project ions based on extrapolation. This can be seen 
most dramaticallly with Lesotho's rapidly r is in g  import 
f igures  : i t  i s  uncertain to what extent they are 
a ttr ibutab le  to a real increase, and to what extent to 
substantially more comprehensive data co l le c t ion .  One 
observes this problem too in  the National Accounts fo r  the 
years 1966/67 to 1971/72 produced in  March 1975. These 
superseded the National accounts fo r  1 9 6 6 / 6 7  and 1 9 6 7 / 6 8  
published in  1968 and 1 9 7 1  respect ive ly ,  and were not 
comparable with those fo r  1 9 6 4 / 6 5  and 1 9 6 5 / 6 6  issued in 
1 9 6 7 , nor with those fo r  the period 1 9 5 4 / 5 5  to 1 9 6 5 / 6 6  compiled 
by an adviser. Sources o f  information and methods employed 
fo r  the most recent sets of f igures d i f fe red  in  a numberpQ
of ways from the e a r l i e r  sets.
A further example of this snag with base data, as also 
the drawback of l e g i s l a t i v e  g9<ps, i s  found in the 
s t a t i s t i c s  produced, fo r  the populations of Lesotho's six 
lowland towns. Comparing the f igures fo r  1966 and 1971/72, 
a survey found that except fo r  Maseru, a l l  the other towns 
had decreased in  s ize .  An analysis of the two sets of 
resu lts  concluded that this would be ' inconceivable ' and 
- 'grotesquely erroneous', pointing out that un t i l  township 
boundaries are re f in ed  and mapped, in  d e ta i l  (which requires 
l e g is la t io n )  no meaningful comparisons could be made
11
between successive population counts and no projections
could be r e l ied  on. Thus the country lacks a key var iab le
in  the forward planning of adequate soc ia l  services in  the 
29urban areas.
This part icu lar  weakness has had a number of 
consequences fo r  the e f fec t iveness  and standing of Lesotho’ s 
CPDO. F i r s t ly ,  i t  has made i t  more problematic to ju s t i f y  
one pro ject above another, leav ing departments with an 
impression of arb itrariness, par t icu lar ly  those which may 
have had a pro ject re jected .  Thi3 matter i s  aggravated by 
a general shortage of a lte rnat ives  which 'plays into the 
hands’ of those who submit pro jects  of dubious worth, fo r  
they can argue that there i s  no adequate substitute fo r  
that which they have submitted1, ^  Secondly, lack of data 
has rendered the inclusion of economic indicators in  
pro ject  memoranda unfeasible or of dubious value. This 
has complicated the task of evaluating progress, so 
leav ing  the Off ice  groping around in i t s  attempts to 
monitor the impact of various undertakings. Thirdly, as 
has been noted, improved methods of s t a t i s t i c a l  c o l le c t ion  
detract from the r e l i a b i l i t y  of benchmark f igures, so 
complicating the M scernment of trends and the extrapolation 
of pro ject ions.
I n i t ia t in g  new' procedures
The preparation of a f iv e -y ea r  plan i s  one of the 
exercises a central planning agency i s  required to carry 
out. I t  may face abstacles, and the product may be 
unsatis factory ; yet, because of a p o l i t i c a l  mandate, i t  
w i l l  be completed. I t  w i l l  a lso be charged with numerous 
other tasks, some of which i t  w i l l  be incapable of 
implementing at the outset but which, from time to time, 
i t  w i l l  endeavour to introduce* The CPDO's single 
experiment with an annual plan provides an example.
The O ff ice  i t s e l f  put considerable e f f o r t  into producing 
the plan, and a f t e r  much coaxing a number of departments 
prepared submis ions.
The document was, however, completed too la te  to be useful 
and fo r  this and other reasons was not published. This 
fa i lu re  meant that the CPDO would have encountered 
decidedly more resistance had i t  attempted to produce a 
plan the fo l low ing  year, which i t  chose not to. A second 
i l lu s t r a t i o n  i s  provided by the O f f i c e 's  various attempts 
at in s t i tu t in g  progress reporting procedures. I t  has, 
however, lacked both the capacity to provide helpful 
responses to those m in istr ies  which complied, and the 
authority to d isc ip l ine  those that did not; that is ,  i t  has 
been unable to back up the procedures with e ither  rewards 
or sanctions, and in consequence they have fa i l e d .  This 
has adversely a f fec ted  the O f f i c e 's  c r e d ib i l i t y ,  so 
contributing to the second.lag; fo r  i t s  next attempt to 
in s t i tu te  a reporting system w i l l  meet with even less 
c ooperati on.
Limited resources
• The focus of this a r t i c l e  i s  on the evolution of
the planning machinery, not on development in  general.
Yet there are links, however unclearly connected; as
indicated by Haq's example, planners are l ik e ly  to be
blamed fo r  fa i lu res  and to reap cred it  fo r  advances,
31whatever the extent of the ir  respons ib i l i ty .  In 
pract ice ,  planning procedures and agencies have generally 
attracted considerable disapprobation fo l low ing the poor 
economic performance of the early post-independence years.
The extremely res tr ic ted  circumstance in  which the 
Lesotho Governement found i t s e l f  a f t e r  independence certa in ly  
weakened the posit ion of the CPDO. The country's economic 
p l igh t  and the determination to end recurrent dependence 
stress t h r i f t  and caution, so restra in ing the more adventurous 
programmes which the planners may have in mind, as well 
as re in forc ing  the control of the already better 
established ana more authoritat ive  Budget O f f ice .  Secondly, 
l im ited  cap ita l  l e f t  the Planning O ff ice  with reduced room 
fo r  manoeuvre, less patronage to dispense and diminished 
influence over the d irec t ion  of development.
I f  (planning) means we should just set targets, 
everyone accepts that there i s  a need for  goals. But 
when that means marshalling scarce resources away 
from something to put into something else -  th a t ’ s 
where the shoe rubs* I f  you say to someone that we 
should l ike  a pro ject in this f i e ld ,  that i s  not 
a problemo I f  you say we should not l ik e  a pro ject 
in  that f i e l d  because we have only so much money 
and manpower and executive capacity, and therefore 
we have to use i t  there instead, you have a problem... 
That’ s a h e l l  of a l o t  harder and takes a lo t  more.p 
muscle than to decide the p r i o r i t i e s  of new money.
Two further consequences were, f i r s t l y ,  that departments
tended to be more f i e r c e l y  competitive fo r  the f ixed  (or
slowly expanding) a l lo ca t ion  of resources, which impeded the
CPDO’ s attempts at coordination and harmonization of programmes
and, secondly, the Planning O f f i c e ’ s d iscret ion  to re je c t  o f fe rs
of aid which i t  considered ir re levan t  to id en t i f i ed  national 
p r io r i t i e s  was severely curta i led .
Time-lag
Contrasting the immediate post-independence pressures 
fo r  evidence of development with the usual inadequate 
capacity to prepare pro jects  (with a l l  the ir  attendant studies- 
engineering, marketing, so i l - type ,  e tc . )  a substantial 
time-lag between conception ana implementation appears 
almost inev itab le .  Typically ,  the time required to prepare 
deta i led  memoranda; obtain technical support information,; 
in te res t ,  negotiate with and obtain f in a l  agreement from 
donors; and await the a r r iv a l  of equipment and personnel 
are underestimated. This i s  aggravated by the practice in 
Lesotho of preparing memoranda on more important pro jects, 
not as f in a l  documents, but rather with the purpose of 
in te res t ing  donors. Thus, i f  successful, the f i r s t  donor 
contribution w i l l  probably be at a p r e f e a s ib i l i t y  study 
stage. During the extended hiatus that fo l lows there i s  
an overa l l  impression oi much preparation(amidst raised 
expectations) without proportionate concrete results.
Two examples are provided by the proposals fo r  a 
national abatto ir  and the National Teachers’ Training College. 
As early as 1962 the Basutoland department of Health 
condemned the Maseru slaughter!, i  i; and recommended the 
building of a new abatto ir .
In 1967 the National Planning; Board repeated the proposal 
as did the Ministry of In t e r io r  011 a number of occasions 
during the next few years. The pro ject was included in  the 
F irs t  Plan and in the f i v e -y ea r  period, negotiations with 
a donor appeared to reach an advanced stage. I t  has again 
been l i s t e d  in  the Second Plan, but by 1976 (fourteen years 
a f t e r  the idea was f i r s t  proposed) commencement s t i l l  seemed
f * 4 ) j
a distant prospect. '  ; The case fo r  a National Teachers’ 
Training College ( to  replace seven small inadequately 
equipped and sta ffed  co l leges ) was f i r s t  recommended in 1964, 
and repeated in  1966 and 1967* In 1969 a UNESCO and World 
Bank project id en t i f i c a t io n  mission visi.ted Lesoth.9, and 
under an agreement with DaNIDA in 1970 a Danish mission 
arr ived  in 1971 to study the pro ject .  Progress was delayed 
by a number of factors such as obtaining the consent of 
Church organizations, in a b i l i t y  to supervise buildings 
lo c a l l y ,  complications about the recruitment of fore ign 
s t a f f  and doveta i l ing  a var ie ty  of donor inputs. Early in 
1975 (that is ,  eleven years a f t e r  inception) the College 
commenced training student teachers -  in  temporary quarters 
since the building of the College had barely commenced,
IV
THE END OF THE SECOND La G ? •
According to the pattern suggested by White's 
’ paradigm’ and Seers’ ’ p l o t ’ , with the passing of time 
cer ta in  components in the planning environment may change 
s u f f i c i e n t ly  to boost the ro le  of planning and the status and 
e f fec t iveness  of the planning machinery. In Lesotho, certa in  
a l te ra t ions  of this nature have indeed combined to bo ls ter  
the pos i t ion  of the CPDO.
F irs t ly ,  the substantial increase in  domestically- 
ava i lab le  resources -  la rge ly  consequent upon the increased 
earnings of migrant workers and the renegotiated terms of 
the customs union agreement -  has placed the Government in  a 
stronger pos it ion to determine the d irec t ion  of development.
Whereas at independence Lesotho was dependent on Brit ish  
support fo r  over ha l f  i t s  recurrent budget and was not in  
a posit ion to contribute at a l l  to i t s  own cap ita l  development 
programme, in the f inanc ia l  year 1 9 7 5 / 6  i t  supported i t s  
own recurrent expenditure and budgeted some R6 . 8  m i l l ion  
o f  i t s  own cap ita l  fo r  development pro jects .  This 
provides an i l lu s t r a t i o n  (supportive of Haq’ s argument 
noted above) of an improvement in  the economic s ituation 
from which a central planning o f f i c e  gains some advantages, 
but fo r  which i t  can claim no more than marginal responsibi l i ty# 
The complex pattern of pressures -  domestic, external, 
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic -  which motivated South A f r i c a ’ s 
decision-makers -  governmental, industr ia l  and mining -  to 
concede to increased sa lar ies  fo r  black workers, owed l i t t l e  
to the e f fo r t s  of the Lesotho Government, l e t  alone the 
1 GPDO. Similarly, although the CPDO and other Lesotho 
Government departments part ic ipated in  the Customs Union 
negotiations of the la te  s ix t ie s ,  much of the i n i t i a t i v e  
or ig inated from the other two small members of the Union.
On the other hand, (as w i l l  be discussed below), fo r  the 
CPDO the blessing has not beem unmixed.
I t  has benefitted in the fo l low ing  ways. F irs t ,  in  
the words of a member of the Planning O ff ice ,  * We no longer 
f e e l  that each time we spend money we are in danger of 
catching a c o ld ’ . A more expansive approach towards 
development projects has provided a more congenial atmosphere 
f o r  the planners. Second, the CPDO is  able to approach 
doners with more confidence that i f  necessary Lesotho w i l l  
be able to contribute to lo ca l  costs of pro jects .  Thirdly,
(and combined with increased donor in te res t  in Lesotho), 
the O ff ice  i s  in  a r e la t i v e ly  stronger pos it ion  to re je c t  
o f fe rs  of assistance which f a i l  to conform to national 
requirements. Fourth, the growth in the Government’ s 
recurrent budget has permitted a marked increase in the 
s t a f f  of the O ff ice  (profess ional,  administrative, c l e r i c a l )  
at the very time when th is was most urgently needed to 
handle the burgeoning resp on s ib i l i t ie s  of  aid negotiation.
And f in a l l y ,  the enlarged professional s ta f f ,  lo ca l  and 
expatr iates, has provided the CPDO with a greater 
concentration of competences an boosted it's influence 
v i s -d - v i s  the Budget Of f i ce .
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A second fac tor  has been the consistent donor support 
which ultimately has forced departments and m inistr ies  to 
concede the necessity of negotiating fore ign  assistance 
through the Planning O f f i c e « Further, donors, par t icu lar ly  
the UNDP, have done much to in s t i tu te  reviews of the 
technical assistance personnel, while regular v i s i t s  by 
Br it ish  personnel from the Southern Afr ican Development 
D iv is ion in  Blantyre serve to keep Brit ish -ass is ted  pro jects  
under o loser  scrutiny than was possible previously. In 
addition, the Planning O ff ice  has made considerable headway 
in  a t t rac t ing  new donor in teres t  and in encouraging an 
acceptance of a programme rather than a pro ject approach 
to the negotiations,
Thirdly, with the passing of a few years, and a f t e r  
the i n i t i a l  discouraging delays, some results became apparent. 
Beyond the raised donor a c t iv i t y ,  some important f e a s ib i l i t y  
studies were completed which served to broaden the information 
base and furnished the deta i led technical back-up data 
essentia l  to requests fo r  assistance. Further, some major 
under-takings such as the Thaba Bosiu, Khomo-khoana and 
Thaba Tseka projects have become operative. This not only 
provides some concrete examples of pro ject  implementation, 
but helps restore confidence that at leas t  some of the 
present pro ject documents being prepared and negotiated 
w i l l  be transformed into r ea l i t y .
A fourth point i s  that, despite the i n i t i a l  negative 
e f f e c t s  of the F irst  Plan, i t s  presence, towards the end 
of the quinquennium, appreared to contribute to overcoming 
the second lag. For, as noted in the paragraph above, 
development a c t i v i t y  picked up considerably and (to  the 
surprise of some) a good number of .the pro jects commenced 
had been included ( in  varying degrees of detail), in  the 
Plan# I t  has thus come to be viewed as less unrea l is t ic  
than o r ig in a l ly  thought. Further, i t  has served to provide 
Government o f f i c e r s  with a rough example of a medium-term 
plan; and thus when preparation of the Second Plan began 
they could better  envisage the nature of the document. 
M in is tr ies  have also come to appreciate that the stronger 
th e ir  submissions, the more l ik e ly  they would be to a t t ra c t ,  
fo re ign  assistance.
Finally ,  the nature of the senior c i v i l  service has 
altered part icu lar ly  inso far  as the average age of the men 
and women holding higher positions is  younger than was the 
case f i v e  or ten years previously. They are themselves 
less  reluctant to accept changes and adaptations and f e e l  
r e l a t i v e l y  less resentment towards the ’ youth1 of the CPDO 
(though remaining impatient at the continuing lack of 
experience of i t s  personnel)• Further, many of them have 
received university educations including courses aimed at 
improving the ir  understanding of planning, and they have 
risen through a c i v i l  service of which the planning machinery 
was part. Also, those older senior o f f i c e r s  who have remained 
on have gradually come to accept the presence of the CPDO,
Despite these changes in  circumstances which promised 
to boost the e f fec t iveness  of the CPDO and so enable i t  to 
terminate the second lag, nevertheless the persistence of a 
number of factors indicated that the transformation might 
not be t o ta l ly  convincing. F irs t ly ,  while the rate of 
turnover of i t s  personnel has been less alarming than in  
previous years, the CPDO continued to lose a number of i t s  
senior o f f i c e r s .  In a matter of three months in the middle 
of 1975 i t  los t  a Senior Planning O ff ice r ,  i t s  Deputy 
D irector and Director, Secondly, the O ff ice  i t s e l f  appeared 
intent on acquiring increasing numbers of expatriates and 
employing them in  fu l l y  operational tasks and i t  was doubtful 
whether loca l  o f f i c e r s  were gaining p ract ica l  experience or 
the necessary tra in ing. However, as long as the more senior 
Basotho continue to be transferred out of the O ff ice ,  this 
s ituat ion  seems l ik e ly  to endure. Thirdly, the enhanced 
capacity of the CPDO has been accompanied by a mounting 
workload; in quantitative terms, this results  in  more aid 
being absorbed, and more a c t i v i t i e s  in i t ia t e d ;  yet qu a l i ta t iv e ly ,  
i t  means that the Planning O ff ice  i s  unlikely to e f f e c t i v e l y  
commence monitoring pro jects  and th e ir  impact, and evaluating 
developmental po l ic ie s  and d irect ions.  Fourthly, the rapid 
growth of Lesotho’ s domestic resources has brought both 
benefits  (noted above) and disadvantages to the CPDO. This 
cap ita l  i s  not subjected to donor c r i t e r ia ,  thus diminishing 
the value to Government of CPDO expertise in  this f i e l4 ,  
while ra is ing  the influence of p o l i t i c a l  leaders as to the 
employment of cap ita l  ava i lab le  to Lesotho. Certain ly from 
some decisions of Governments over the las t  few years, i t  
might appear that the CPDO,
while becoming a more competent aid negotiat ing agency, might 
be in  the process of being removed further from policy  making 
(measured in  terms of advice sought and/or fo l lowed ).
Examples of some s ign i f ican t  measures ins t i tu ted  without 
r e f e ra l  into the CPDO were the increases in teachers ’ 
sa lar ies ,  the establishment of a Lesotho National Bus Service 
furnished with a large consignment of imported veh ic les, 
the building of  a royal palace, and the negotiations fo r  the 
construction of a Hilton Hotel in  Maseru*
Clearly in  a l l  these cases there i s  a substantial 
p o l i t i c a l  and/or prestige element which would be l ik e ly  to 
preclude the acceptance of planners’ views as f in a l  on 
whether to proceed or not* Nevertheless, the ir  advice on 
the consequences and various aspects of the implementation of 
these proposals may have been advantageous, and ind ica t ive  of 
regard fo r  the CPDO. For instance, .in the case of the 
decision to proceed with the f e a s ib i l i t y  study fo r  an 
international a irport,  the Government disagreed with CPDO 
opposition to the scheme, but at least  gave i t  the opportunity 
to study and comment upon proposals,, Here, however, an aid 
request i s  involved (since the Government intends to employ 
fore ign  rather than domestic resources) and the Cabinet ms.y 
thus have f e l t  compelled to include the Planning O ff ice  in 
the negotiations.
The p o ss ib i l i t y  that the p o l i t i c a l  leaders perceive 
o f  the planning machinery rather narrowly in  terms of i t s  
aid-procuring role  finds support in two issues of importance 
in  which the CPDO was included. These concerned the o i l  
c r i s i s  -  the e f fe c ts  of price increases and the potentia l  
e f fe c ts  of  South A f r i c a ’ s supply being reduced - and the 
return of large numbers o f  workers a f t e r  the trouble on the 
mines. In both cases one of the principa l responses of the 
Lesotho Government was to seek fore ign  aid and advice.
19.
v
In  conclusion, the planning machinery does appear 
to have overcome the second lag. I t  has established i t s  
pos it ion  in and has been accepted as part of the administration. 
In comparison with the f i r s t  few years of i t s  existence, i t  i s  
a markedly more e f f i c i e n t  organization handling a fa r  more 
complex donor programme. In terms of in i t i a t in g  and 
administering the various tasks of planning i t  has made 
advances, but these have been l im ited  in the main to those 
concerned with the procurement of fore ign  assistance (which 
the Lesotho Government continues to judge as v i t a l  to i t s  
development programme). Even in  those tasks, however, i t s  
own management and the response which i t  receives leave 
considerable room fo r  improvement. I t  has made disappointing 
progress in  enhancing i t s  capacity to monitor and evaluate 
the implementation of development schemes and the impact 
of decisions, po l ic ie s  and programmes on the country's 
economy and on Basotho society .  F inally ,  i t s  potentia l  
influence on and relevance to central policy-making remain 
unc erta in.
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